How College Enrollment Strategies Affect Student Labor Market Success by Cheslock, John J & Hilmer, Michael J
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Cornell Higher Education Research Institute 
(CHERI) Centers, Institutes, Programs 
December 2001 
How College Enrollment Strategies Affect Student Labor Market 
Success 
John J. Cheslock 
University of Arizona 
Michael J. Hilmer 
University of Louisville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers, Institutes, Programs at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Higher Education Research Institute (CHERI) by 
an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
How College Enrollment Strategies Affect Student Labor Market Success 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] This paper analyzes how the composition of an institution’s student body affects the 
performance of that institution’s students. In particular, we investigate how the average student quality 
and the dispersion in student quality within the student body affects the future earnings of individual 
students. We begin in section II by examining the two primary reasons why one’s fellow students would 
affect future labor market success: peer effects and employer screening. Peer effects are important 
because one’s peers can augment or detract from human capital accumulation through numerous types 
of interactions. The literature examining these potential effects is growing, and we summarize the work 
and relate the findings to our specific question. 
The second reason, employer screening, captures the role of one’s fellow students in shaping the beliefs 
of employers about the quality of students at the institution. These beliefs may affect employers’ actions 
in two manners. First, the level of student quality may affect the intensity by which employers recruit at 
that institution. Second, the dispersion in student quality may affect the degree to which employers 
screen by ability when interviewing the institution’s students. We formalize this discussion of employer 
behavior with a screening model. 
The analyses in Section II generate several predictions, and we turn next to tests of their validity. After 
reviewing past research on the topic in Section III, we use the 1982 cohort of the High School and Beyond 
survey in Section IV to provide additional evidence. Our findings are consistent with much of the previous 
literature. We find that the level of student quality at an institution is an important determinant of 
earnings; a 100 point increase in the median SAT is related to a 3 percent increase in a student’s annual 
earnings. In addition, students with lower SAT scores appear to receive the highest premium from 
attending an institution with a high median SAT. We do not find that the range in ability of one’s peers is a 
strong predictor of earnings. While some evidence suggests that that those at the bottom of the 
institution’s ability distribution suffer a wage penalty from an increased spread in student ability, the 
relationship is fairly weak and not statistically significant. 
Keywords 
enrollment, labor market outcomes, resource allocation, college recruitment 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Cheslock, J. J., Hilmer, M. J. (2001) How college enrollment strategies affect student labor market 
success (CHERI Working Paper #19). Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, ILR School site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri/13 
Required Publisher Statement 
Published by the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute, Cornell University. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri/13 
 
 
 
 
 
How College Enrollment Strategies Affect 
Student Labor Market Success 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
John J. Cheslock 
and 
Michael J. Hilmer 
 
December 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The authors wish to thank Deborah Anderson, Ronald Ehrenberg, and George 
Jakubson for helpful comments.  The first author gratefully acknowledges financial 
support from the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute (CHERI), which is 
funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and other donors.  All opinions 
expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.  This work is preliminary.  
Please do not cite without permission of the authors.  Please direct comments and 
inquiries to cheslock@u.arizona.edu. 
 1 
 
I. Introduction 
 At the level of elementary and secondary schooling, the question of how the 
quality of one’s classmates affects performance has long been viewed as vital to 
developing effective policies.  The answer to this question helps determine the 
potential benefits and costs of policies such as tracking by ability or voucher systems.  
Because of the importance of the topic, it is not surprising that starting with James 
Coleman’s influential report in the 1960s, Equality of Educational Opportunity, much 
time and research has been devoted to furthering our understanding of how one’s peers 
affect performance at these levels of schooling. 
 Much less effort, however, has been devoted to understanding how one’s 
fellow students affects performance within higher education.  This disparity is not 
necessarily surprising because unlike lower levels of schooling, the government does 
play as large a role in assigning students to institutions.  Students have historically 
enjoyed more freedom in choosing which public institution to attend, and the private 
sector in higher education is quite substantial in certain regions of the country.  
Nonetheless, state systems of higher education do regularly face policy decisions that 
require an understanding of how individual students are affected by the other students 
at their institution.  For example, the allocation of state resources across institutions 
influence student choice and thereby affect both the variation in average student 
ability across institutions as well as the variation in student ability within each 
institution.   
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 In addition to state systems, individual institutions often make decision that 
shape the composition of their student body, and consequently, the potential 
performance of their students.  There are numerous examples of these decisions.  
Should more recruiting and aid dollars be spent to secure a substantial number of high 
ability students?  When faced with financial troubles, should admission standards be 
lowered to increase enrollment?  Should the number of transfer students on campus be 
increased to replace students lost through attrition? Should large amounts of resources 
be devoted to improving honors colleges in order to attract top students?  To answer 
any of these questions optimally, institutions must understand the potential 
implications on student performance of adjusting the composition of their student 
body. 
 This paper analyzes how the composition of an institution’s student body 
affects the performance of that institution’s students.  In particular, we investigate how 
the average student quality and the dispersion in student quality within the student 
body affects the future earnings of individual students. We begin in section II by 
examining the two primary reasons why one’s fellow students would affect future 
labor market success: peer effects and employer screening.  Peer effects are important 
because one’s peers can augment or detract from human capital accumulation through 
numerous types of interactions.  The literature examining these potential effects is 
growing, and we summarize the work and relate the findings to our specific question. 
 The second reason, employer screening, captures the role of one’s fellow 
students in shaping the beliefs of employers about the quality of students at the 
institution.  These beliefs may affect employers’ actions in two manners.  First, the 
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level of student quality may affect the intensity by which employers recruit at that 
institution.  Second, the dispersion in student quality may affect the degree to which 
employers screen by ability when interviewing the institution’s students.  We 
formalize this discussion of employer behavior with a screening model.   
 The analyses in Section II generate several predictions, and we turn next to 
tests of their validity.  After reviewing past research on the topic in Section III, we use 
the 1982 cohort of the High School and Beyond survey in Section IV to provide 
additional evidence.  Our findings are consistent with much of the previous literature.  
We find that the level of student quality at an institution is an important determinant of 
earnings; a 100 point increase in the median SAT is related to a 3 percent increase in a 
student’s annual earnings.  In addition, students with lower SAT scores appear to 
receive the highest premium from attending an institution with a high median SAT.  
We do not find that the range in ability of one’s peers is a strong predictor of earnings.  
While some evidence suggests that that those at the bottom of the institution’s ability 
distribution suffer a wage penalty from an increased spread in student ability, the 
relationship is fairly weak and not statistically significant. 
 
II. Theoretical Motivation 
 To explain why the composition of an institution’s student body may affect the 
later labor market success of a particular student at that institution, it is important to 
discuss the two primary reasons that a student’s performance would be affected by her 
 4 
fellow students.1  First, classmates may impact the amount of human capital 
accumulated during college because students are an important input into the 
educational process.  Second, present and past students help form the view of 
employers about the future productivity of graduates from an institution.  The 
discussion in this section analyzes both the peer effects and employer screening 
explanations in more detail.  In addition, implications of these two explanations on the 
earnings effect of average student quality and the dispersion of student quality are 
outlined. 
It is generally accepted that peer effects are an important part of higher 
education.2  A student’s interaction with her peers in class, study groups, student 
organizations, and social circles can potentially affect how much she learns as well as 
the values and habits she develops.  In addition to these individual-level peer effects, 
the student body as a whole may create institutional-level peer effects that influence 
such factors as the speed and depth of the material covered in courses or the norms for 
behavior on campus. 
The importance of peer effects in education was first suggested by the 
influential report Equality of Educational Opportunity which found that the 
characteristics of a student’s peers was a stronger determinant of performance than 
other factors such as teacher characteristics (Coleman et. al., 1966).  Other researchers 
continued to focus on peer effects in the K-12 setting and investigated more complex 
                                                          
1 Preferential treatment of an institution’s students by successful alumni is a third reason not discussed 
here.  
2 This belief probably underlies the actions of institutions, which expend large amounts of resources to 
secure a high quality student body, and college rankings publications, which base rankings partially on 
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relationships between peers and performance.  One influential paper is by Henderson, 
Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau (1978) who analyzed 7,000 Montreal students between 
the first and third grades and found that student gains in French and mathematics tests 
increased with average classroom IQ.  These gains, however, slowed as mean IQ rises, 
suggesting that a weak student benefits more from a “peer rich” environment than a 
strong student is hurt by a “peer poor” environment. 
 Recent work improves upon earlier research by using more sophisticated 
methods that eliminate many of the concerns that make the identification of peer 
effects difficult.  Identification is hard because students with highly able peers may be 
highly able in ways unobservable to the researcher.  In addition, they may have access 
to better teacher and school resources that also are not observable.  Beyond these 
concerns, the estimation is further complicated by the fact that student and peer 
achievement are determined simultaneously. 
Hanushek et. all (2001) uses a large panel data set, the Texas Schools 
Microdata Sample, that follows the performance of successive cohorts of students in 
Texas schools during the 1990s.3   The richness of this data set allows them to 
compare changes from one cohort to another within a specific school, which 
eliminates some of the above concerns because much of the year-to-year variation in 
the quality of students is not likely to be correlated with strategic parental location 
decisions or school inputs.  Using school-by-grade fixed effects, they find that 
                                                                                                                                                                       
student quality measures.  For an insightful and more general discussion of peer effects in higher 
education, see Goethals, Winston, and Zimmerman (1999). 
3 Hoxby (2000) also uses this data set in her analysis of how the gender and race composition of an 
individual’s cohort affects his or her performance. She finds that one’s performance does increase with 
the ability of their classmates, but she does not discover any non-linearities. 
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throughout the ability distribution, test scores improve with better peers; they also 
present evidence that those in the top of the ability distribution gain the least.  In 
addition, they examine how the dispersion of ability within the student cohort affects 
performance and find a non-linear relationship.  Greater dispersion has no effect for 
the top half of the ability distribution and has a statistically significant negative effect 
for the bottom quartile of students.  
While historically much less research has focused on peer effects in higher 
education, there has been a recent surge in this area of research.  Several authors have 
recognized that the method of assigning students to campus housing at many 
institutions presents a natural experiment where students do not self-select their own 
peers but instead are randomly assigned roommates and dormmates.  Therefore, 
estimates of the effect of one’s peers in a housing unit should not be contaminated by 
selection bias.  This line of research produces convincing evidence on peer effects 
produced in housing and social situations.  However, the evidence may not accurately 
describe other important peer effects that take place at the classroom or campus level. 
There have been three studies using this methodology.  Sacerdote (2000, 2001) 
examines students at Dartmouth College, Zimmerman (1999) examines students at 
Williams College, and Kremer and Levy (2000) examine a large state university that is 
considered “highly competitive” in Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges.  Because 
all three institutions are highly selective, one should be cautious in applying the 
findings to less selective schools. 
In his analysis of students at Williams College, Zimmerman (1999) finds 
limited evidence of peer effects on student grade point average (GPA).  He does, 
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however, find some small, but statistically significant results.  First, he finds that 
students in middle 70 percent of the distribution of SAT scores at Williams achieve a 
lower GPA when assigned to a room with a student with a verbal SAT score in the 
bottom 15 percent of the distribution as opposed to a student in the top 15 percent.  
When he examines the effect of one’s average entry (cluster of nearby rooms) SAT 
score, he finds that students in the bottom 15 percent of the distribution are now the 
group hurt by having low quality peers.  Students in the top 15 percent of the 
distribution are never found to be affected by their peers.  
The analyses of Dartmouth roommates by Sacerdote (2000, 2001) finds similar 
results in that peer effects are found to be small, but statistically significant in many 
instances.  The GPA of Dartmouth students increases when they are assigned to a 
roommate that is in the top 25 percent of the ability distribution and intends to 
graduate with honors.  Those in the bottom and top 25 percent of the ability 
distribution are affected most by the characteristics of their roommate.  Sacerdote also 
finds that the fraternity and sorority membership as well as high school alcohol use of 
one’s roommates and dormmates are highly predictive of whether one joins the Greek 
system.  These results suggest that peer effects in housing may be most influential in 
one’s social life. 
Kremer and Levy (2000) find that the past drinking behavior of one’s 
roommates actually influences academic performance.  Males earn lower GPAs when 
they were assigned to roommates who claim they drank frequently or occasionally in 
high school.  Quantile regressions demonstrate that this effect is especially strong for 
men at the lower end of the GPA distribution.  Interestingly, they find little evidence 
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that the academic pre-college characteristics of one’s roommate affects one’s GPA.  
However, they use numerous background characteristics simultaneously (high school 
GPA, standardized test scores, parents income and education) unlike the other two 
papers which focus on fewer characteristics.   
The literature on peer effects reviewed to this point demonstrate some 
commonalities that can be used to predict how a student’s future labor market earnings 
could be affected by the level and spread of student ability at their institution.  These 
papers consistently find that the academic background of one’s peers do influence 
performance in a positive manner suggesting that as the average ability of the student 
body of one’s institution increases, one’s academic performance (and subsequent 
earnings) should increase.  Students with less ability may experience the largest gain 
as much of the research detailed above finds these students are especially sensitive to 
their peers.   
The literature on peer effects does not provide much evidence that helps one 
predict how the spread of student ability at an institution impacts a student’s future 
earnings.  To make a reliable prediction, one needs to understand whether students in 
the top of the campus ability distribution have a greater or lesser influence on their 
peers than students in the bottom of the distribution.  Either scenario seems plausible.  
For example, top students could disproportionately affect the speed and quality of 
classroom lectures by participating more than their peers in classroom discussions.  
Alternatively, less able students could be more influential by causing professors to 
slow the pace of lectures to ensure that all students are comprehending the material.  
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Each type of student could also disproportionately affect the campus norms for 
academic and social behavior. 
While the average impact of increased dispersion of student ability may be 
unclear given our current knowledge of peer effects in higher education, some 
predictions on how different groups of students are impacted relative to others can be 
made.  Most likely, students disproportionately spend time with other students in the 
same part of the institution’s ability distribution because they self-select themselves 
into the same courses, groups, and organizations.  Therefore, one would expect the 
high ability students on campus to benefit most from the increased dispersion of 
student ability because they are more likely to spend time in and out of the classroom 
with students in the upper tail of the institution’s ability distribution.  Likewise, one 
would expect the low ability students to suffer most from a worsened lower tail.4  In 
addition, if students at the bottom of the ability distribution are more sensitive to peer 
effects than other students as suggested in the research reviewed above, then the 
increased dispersion of ability may hurt the bottom students more than it would help 
students in the top of the distribution.   
Even if peer effects are not important, one’s fellow students can still influence 
future labor market success by shaping employers’ beliefs.  Employers will be likely 
to judge an individual’s future productivity by the institution he or she attended if they 
consistently find that students of some institutions are of different quality than those at 
other institutions.  Even in the absence of prior experience with graduates from a 
                                                          
4 In the research summarize above, Hanushek et. all (2001) provides the only evidence on the effect of 
the range of student ability on performance.  Their results support these predictions; students in the 
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particular institution, employers might differentiate employees by institution attended 
if they believe that more human capital accumulation takes place at some institutions, 
that these institutions require more ability to persist to graduation, or that the strictness 
of admission officers at some institutions ensures that that their students are of high 
ability. 
 The ability of an institution’s student body might alter employers’ behavior in 
two ways.  First, employers may change the amount of recruiting they do at an 
institution, and second, they might adjust the intensity by which they screen by ability 
when recruiting an individual from that institution.  Because screening by ability is 
costly, employers will only increase the intensity of the screen when there is a large 
benefit to the activity.  
 To further analyze employer’s behavior, I present here a screening model in 
the tradition of Spence (1973).  This model analyzes the student body of a single 
institution and assumes that all students are of two types, A and B, which have a 
productivity level of A and B respectively, with A > B.  Students of type A represent h 
percent of the student body and students of type B represent the remaining (1-h) 
percent.  Upon leaving the institution, students are hired by employers who can utilize 
available information to make their determination whether a student is of type A or B.  
The employer can vary their effort to improve this “screen”; Q represents the 
probability that the employer correctly identifies the student’s type while (1-Q) 
                                                                                                                                                                       
bottom quartile of the ability distribution are the only students who are hurt by an increase in the range 
of ability. 
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represents an incorrect assessment.  The employer suffers a screening cost, C(Q), 
which increases with the amount of information obtained. 
 With these definitions, the productivity of the hired employee when employers 
do not screen is:  
W1 = Ah + B(1-h)   (1) 
The productivity of a student hired when the employer screens for type A students is 
denoted by: 
W2 = AF[h,Q] + B{1-F[h,Q]} (2)  
where 
]1][1[
],[
QhhQ
hQQhF −−+=   (3) 
An employer would decide to screen when the benefits of screening, equation (2) 
minus equation (1), are greater than the costs, C(QS).  Therefore, a firm would screen 
when:  
C(Q) < (A-B){F[h,Q]- h}  (4) 
Using similar logic, a firm would increase the strength of its screen from QW to QS 
(where QS > QW) when: 
C(QS)–C(QW) < (A-B){F[h,QS]-F[h,QW]}  (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) suggest that firms are more likely to employ strong “screens” 
when there is a wide variation in ability between students on campus and when the 
cost of increasing the screen by ability is small. 
 If one assumes that each type of student is correctly identified as their true type 
Q percent of the time and that employers pay workers their average productivity level 
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minus any screening costs, one can show how changes in the level and spread of 
student ability affect the wages of each type of student.5  First, the average wage of 
both types of students will rise when the ability of either type A or B students 
increases and h does not change.  Second, the average wage of type A students 
increases relative to the average wage of type B students when firms increase the 
intensity by which they screen by ability at an institution.  This result is not surprising 
because one would expect A students to benefit from increased screening because 
their probability of being correctly identified and assigned the higher wage rises with 
stronger screens.  This result suggests that increases in the spread of ability, which 
causes ability screens at the institution to strengthen, will help type A students relative 
to type B students.  Interestingly, the two prediction outlined in this paragraph are 
identical to those suggested by the peer effects literature. 
This screening model also provides insights into the difference in earnings for 
any other two groups that can be distinguished by employers and have different 
productivity levels.  For example, an institution’s pool of transfers and direct attendees 
could have different levels of ability on average.  For this special case, assume that the 
more productive group has the average productivity level of A while the other group’s 
productivity level is B.  In addition, assume that when the firm decides to screen, they 
can screen perfectly and correctly identify students 100 percent of the time while 
incurring a cost of C(QT).  Using the same logic as above, one can determine that 
employers screen when:  
C(QT) < (A-B){1-hA}  (6) 
                                                          
5 Proofs for the results outlined in this paragraph are available from the authors. 
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This questions suggests that firms will be more likely to differentiate between the two 
groups of students when there is a wide variation in ability between the groups, when 
the lower productivity group is a large percentage of the student body, and when the 
cost of screening between the groups is lower.  In addition, it can be shown that the 
wages of the more productive group increase relative to the other group when 
employers screens. 
This section demonstrates that both student peer effects and employer behavior 
can cause the composition of an institution’s student body to affect the labor market 
success of its students.  Both concepts predict that an individual’s earnings will 
increase as the average ability of the institution’s student body improves.  In addition, 
they both suggest that while an increase in the spread of ability of one’s classmates has 
an uncertain effect on performance in general, it should hurt students at the bottom of 
the institutions ability distribution relative to students in the top of the distribution. 
 
III. Related Literature 
Past work has provided some insights into the effect on earnings of both the 
average ability and the dispersion of ability within an institution’s student body.  The 
former characteristic has been investigated in detail in the literature investigating the 
returns to college quality.  While this literature is interested in the effects of attending 
institutions of different quality in general, they often use the quality of an institution’s 
student body as a proxy for overall school quality.  The relevant part of this research 
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can be put into two groups.6  One group of papers directly measures student quality 
with the average or median SAT score of the freshman class of an institution (James et 
al, 1989; Daniel, Black, and Smith, 1995; Loury and Garman, 1995, Kane, 1998; Dale 
and Krueger, 1999; Hilmer, 2000b).  Other researchers indirectly measure student 
quality by using rankings from college publications such as Barron’s Profiles of 
American Colleges  (Fox, 1993, Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg, 1999; Hoxby, 1999).  
These publications incorporate student test scores in their ranking methodology and, 
hence, are heavily correlated with student quality. 
 Almost all of the literature finds that students who attend institutions with 
higher test scores or higher rankings have greater success in the labor market.  For 
example, attending a college with a 100-point higher average SAT score is generally 
associated with 3 to 7 percent higher earnings later in life (James et al, 1989; Daniel, 
Black, and Smith, 1995; Loury and Garman, 1995; Kane, 1998).  While part of this 
return may reflect that institutions with higher test scores also spend more per student 
or have other favorable characteristics, these strong results suggest that one’s fellow 
students do affect later labor market performance.7  
 Much less attention has been paid to the effect of the distribution of student 
ability at an institution, although two papers investigate this briefly.  Using the College 
and Beyond survey (which primarily consists of very selective institutions), Dale and 
                                                          
6 This review covers most of the recent literature.  See Brewer and Ehrenberg (1996) for a thorough 
review of the entire literature. 
7 An additional concern is that the return to attending a more selective institution simply represents the 
greater ability of the students who attend these schools.  All the papers cited try to control for this 
problem by including ability measures such as standardized test scores or family background variables.  
Only two of the papers specifically attempt to net out the effect of unobserved variables (Brewer, Eide, 
and Ehrenberg, 1999; Dale and Krueger, 1999).  The results vary significantly with the method used. 
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Krueger (1999) find that greater dispersion in SAT scores is negatively associated 
with earnings for schools with the highest average SAT scores in the sample and 
positive associated with earnings for schools with the lowest SAT scores in the 
sample. Hoxby and Terry (1999) report similar results using the National Longitudinal 
Study of the Class of 1972 and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth which both 
contain students who attend a more representative sample of institutions.  However, 
neither paper investigates whether this dispersion has different effects on individuals 
of varying ability levels.  
 
IV. New Evidence 
The primary data used in this paper are from the High School and Beyond 
(HSB) survey.  We use data on individuals in the 1982 cohort who have annual 
earnings of at least $5,000 for whom the restricted 1992 (fifth follow-up) survey 
covers up to six years in the labor market after college graduation.  This data set is 
ideal for this paper because it identifies the institution that each student attended and 
because the students attended college during years in which we have access to credible 
measures of the distribution of student ability at each institution.  In addition, 
individual ability measures are available in the form of standardized test scores for 
each student.8 
Data on individual students are matched with data on the college or university 
they attended.  These institutional data come from three sources and are collected from 
                                                          
8 The High School and Beyond survey retrieved SAT scores from high school records, when such 
scores were available.  For the remaining individuals, we estimate SAT scores from the HSB test 
 16 
the year closest to 1982 when many of the HSB seniors were first entering college. 
The first source, Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges, provides the median SAT 
scores of the institution’s freshman class as well as the faculty-student ratio at the 
institution.9  The College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges provides the 25th and 75th 
percentiles of SAT scores of that institution’s freshman class.  We use the difference 
between the 75th and 25th percentiles as our measure of the dispersion of student 
ability at an institution.  The final variables for enrollment and expenditure levels 
come from CASPAR, which contains data gathered by the U.S. Department of 
Education in its Higher Education General Information System (HEGIS) and 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) surveys.  Summary 
statistics for the final sample are presented in Table 1. 
To test the hypotheses presented in Section II, we regress the logarithm of 
annual earnings on the variables of interest as well as demographic and family 
background variables.  The analyses in Table 2 examine how an individual’s earnings 
is related to the median SAT score of the student body at their institution.10  The 
specification in column (1) is similar to much of the literature that investigates the 
returns to attending a selective institution, and the results are consistent with past 
work; a 100 point increase in the school-median SAT score is associated with 
approximately 3 percent higher annual earnings. The results in Column (2) 
                                                                                                                                                                       
battery, using an ordinary least squares equation estimated for students who had both SAT and HSB 
scores.  The regressions fit very well as the R-squared was around .60. 
9 SAT scores are imputed, using ACT scores, for the small number of schools that provide ACT scores 
but not SAT scores.  We use the concordance tables in Astin (1971) for the transformation. 
10 The discussion earlier in the paper was based on the mean SAT score.  We use the median score 
because the mean is not available in the data sets used.  The mean and median are likely to be quite 
similar, so this should not create much measurement error. 
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demonstrate that the effect of the institution’s median SAT score on annual earnings is 
larger for those who score lower on the SAT themselves.  This result is similar to the 
finding in the peer effects literature that the performance of students in the bottom of 
the ability distribution is more sensitive to the quality of their peers.   
The results found in the first two specifications may reflect a return to general 
institutional quality because school-median SAT scores are correlated with other 
aspects of institutional quality that might promote labor market success.  When we 
control for other inputs into the educational process, such as the student/faculty ratio, 
total enrollment level, instructional expenditures per students, and institutional type 
(see columns (3)), the relationship between median SAT score and annual earnings 
remains relative unchanged.11  This result suggests that the quality of the student body 
is more than simply a proxy for general institutional quality. 
 Table 3 investigates the relationship between one’s earnings and the spread in 
student ability at that person’s institution; the level of dispersion is measured by the 
75th percentile minus the 25th percentile of an institution’s freshman test scores.  The 
results in column (1) demonstrates that, on average, the variation in SAT scores has 
little effect on one’s earnings.  Specification (2) interacts the spread in SAT scores 
with the median SAT score, and the results are similar to those found in the work 
reviewed in Section III.  More range in student ability seems to have a positive effect 
for students who attend institutions with a lower median SAT score while students 
from institutions with a higher median SAT score earn less when there is greater 
                                                          
11 The results suggest that students earn more when attending private institutions and institutions with 
higher enrollment.  Interestingly, we do not find that student’s earnings increase when they attend 
institutions that have higher educational expenditures per student or more faculty per student. 
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dispersion.  This relationship, however, is weaker than found in previous papers and is 
not statistically significant. 
 The discussion in Section II predicts that the effect of the dispersion of student 
ability on an individual student’s earnings will vary by the position of that individual 
student in her institution’s ability distribution.  In other words, students who are 
“undermatched” by having higher SAT scores than most of the student body will be 
impacted differently than “overmatched” students who have lower SAT scores than 
their fellow students.  Before investigating how the variance of ability affects earnings 
for these students, we examine whether being undermatched or overmatched affects 
wages in general in column (3).  A student is viewed as being poorly matched when 
their test score differs from the institution’s median test score by 100 points.  Using 
this definition, we find that approximately one-fourth of the sample is undermatched 
and another one-fourth is overmatched.  The results provide weak evidence that there 
is a penalty to being undermatched, and there is no evidence that being overmatched 
affects earnings. 
The analysis in column (4) tests whether the effect of the spread of student 
ability on earnings varies with the student’s position in the institution’s ability 
distribution.  Our discussion in section II predicted that an increase in dispersion 
would hurt overmatched students and help undermatched students relative to the 
student of median ability on campus.  We test this claim by interacting the spread in 
student ability with the indicator variables for having test scores 100 points from the 
institution’s median score.  The coefficients for both interaction terms have the 
predicted signs, but they are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  While 
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not significant, the coefficient for the interaction for overmatched students is of 
moderate size and suggests that a 100 point increase in the difference between the 75th 
and 25th percentile leads to a 1.6% drop in wages for overmatched students. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper investigates how two aspects of an institution’s student body, the 
average student ability and the dispersion of student ability, impacts the earnings of 
individual students at the institution.  We discuss how these two aspects could impact 
an individual’s earnings by outlining the role one’s fellow student play in human 
capital accumulation and in developing employer’s beliefs about the quality of an 
institution’s graduates.  Our discussion produces several predictions which we test 
using data from the High School and Beyond survey.  Our results mostly support our 
predictions.  We find that earnings increase when one attends an institution with a high 
quality student body even when controls for other aspects of institutional quality are 
added.  This increase appears to be highest for those of lowest academic ability.  We 
do not find large and statistically significant effects for the dispersion in student 
ability, but the evidence suggests that students at the bottom of the institution’s ability 
distribution are hurt by increased dispersion. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Individual Characteristics:
Annual Earnings 26226
(14603)
Own SAT 935
(163)
Male 0.4809
Black 0.1211
Hispanic 0.1778
Other Race 0.0008
Attending school full time 0.0142
Family Income:
$8,000 to $14,999 0.1174
$15,000 to $19,999 0.1219
$20,000 to $24,999 0.1332
$25,000 to $29,999 0.1405
$30,000 to $39,999 0.1817
$40,000 to $49,999 0.1058
Greater Than $50,000 0.1496
Institution's Characterisitics
50th SAT 950
(123)
75th-25th SAT 265
(129)
% Own - 50th > 100 0.2870
% Own - 50th < -100 0.2222
Public Control 0.4782
Instructional Exp. Per Student (in 1,000s) 8.4752
(9.7405)
Faculty/Student Ratio 0.0485
(0.0401)
Total Enrollment 11017
(9242)
Notes:  Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis)
are reported.
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Table 2: Effect of Institution's Level of Stude  
Quality on Future Earnings
(1) (2) (3)
Own SAT / 100 0.0312** 0.0444** 0.0440**
(0.0050) (0.0081) (0.0081)
50th SAT / 100 0.0332** 0.0570** 0.0536**
(0.0076) (0.0138) (0.0145)
Own SAT / 100 * 50th SAT / 100 -0.0020* -0.0020*
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Public Control -0.0657**
(0.0205)
Total Enrollment, logged 0.0172**
(0.0044)
Instructional Exp. Per Student -0.0016
(0.0011)
Faculty/Student Ratio -0.0933
(0.2904)
Adj. R2 0.1032 0.1038 0.1070
Notes:  Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported.  * (**) denotes 
statistical significance at a 95 (99) percent level of confidence.  Dependent variable is 
log of 1991 annual earnings.  Regressions also include indicator variables for sex, 
race/ethnicity, attending school full-time, and family income (eight categories).  Dummy
variables included for missing values, in which case those variables are set to 0.
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Table 3: Effect of Institution's Heterogeneity of Student 
Quality on Future Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own SAT / 100 0.0311** 0.0310** 0.0372** 0.0372**
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0068) (0.0068)
50th SAT / 100 0.0343** 0.0419** 0.0274** 0.0282**
(0.0076) (0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0096)
(75th SAT - 25th SAT) / 100 -0.0018 0.0291 -0.0017 0.0009
(0.0066) (0.0285) (0.0066) (0.0087)
50th SAT / 100 * (75th - 25th) / 100 -0.0031
(0.0028)
Own - 50th > 100 -0.0338 -0.0462
(0.0237) (0.0361)
Own - 50th < -100 0.0088 0.0454
(0.0248) (0.0393)
(75th - 25th) / 100 * Own - 50th > 100 0.0056
(0.0126)
(75th - 25th) / 100 * Own - 50th < -100 -0.0169
(0.0139)
Adj. R2 0.1031 0.1031 0.1031 0.1031
Notes:  Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported.  * (**) denotes 
statistical significance at a 95 (99) percent level of confidence.  Dependent variable is 
log of 1991 annual earnings.  Regressions also include indicator variables for sex, 
race/ethnicity, attending school full-time, and family income (eight categories).  Dummy
variables included for missing values, in which case those variables are set to 0.
